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ABSTRACT 
 
Using a random sample of 140 of China’s listed firms, we show an adverse impact of 
related party (RP) sales of goods and services on the usefulness of accounting earnings 
to investors and on the quality of earnings forecasts by financial analysts. Consistent 
with the contention that RP sales may violate the arm’s-length assumption of regular 
transactions and consequently impair the representational faithfulness and verifiability 
of accounting data, we find that earnings of firms engaged in RP sales are at least 33% 
less informative after controlling for factors known to affect earnings informativeness. 
We also find that financial analysts are overly credulous in their acceptance of earnings 
numbers that are contaminated by unreliable RP sales, and provide less accurate and 
more optimistic earnings forecasts for firms with more RP sales. Overall, our results 
provide strong empirical evidence on the negative impact of RP transactions on the 
usefulness of accounting earnings data used by investors and by financial analysts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper investigates the impact of related party (RP) transactions on earnings 
informativeness as perceived by investors and the quality of earnings forecasts made by 
financial analysts. RP transactions may violate the arm’s-length assumption of regular 
transactions and consequently impair the representational faithfulness and verifiability 
of accounting data. Recent corporate scandals such as Enron and Adelphia, to name just 
two, exemplify how RP transactions may reduce the reliability of reported earnings. 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has long been expressing concerns 
about the possible negative impact of RP transactions on the reliability of financial 
information, in terms of both representational faithfulness and reliability of reported 
amounts (SFAS 57, 15), while previous research provides empirical evidence of a 
significant positive association between RP transactions and earnings manipulation 
(e.g., Gordon and Henry 2003, in the US, and Aharony, Wang, and Yuan 2010, in 
China). The evidence suggests the possibility of an adverse impact of RP transactions 
on the quality of accounting numbers. 
There are various types of RP transactions. On a set of RP transactions for 366 
American public firms that they hand-collected during the years 2000-2001, Gordon 
and Henry (2003) identify several major types of RP transactions, such as direct 
transactions with employees or with board members, contract services or legal services 
acquired from management, sales to (purchases from) related parties and loans to 
(from) related parties. Their statistics show that 47% of their sample firms provided 
loans to RPs, 20.2% engaged in direct service relations involving an executive and 
another related party, while 19.2% made purchases from RPs, and 11.3% made sales to 
related parties. In contrast, Aharony et al. (2010) show that around 60% of Chinese 
initial public offerings during the period 1999-2001 engaged in sales of goods and 
services to their controlling parent companies, in a mean dollar amount of US$ 23.57 
million, compared with a mean of US$3.66 million for Gordon and Henry’s (2003) 
American sample. 
Our study focuses on the impact of RP sales of goods and services on earnings 
informativeness as perceived by capital market investors, and on the quality of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts, the reason being that RP sales have the most direct impact on 
earnings number. We choose a Chinese setting for our analysis because China provides 
both a unique institutional setting and RPT data. Our results provide an assessment of 
the extent to which RP sales of goods and services contribute to impairing earnings 
informativeness and the quality of analysts’ forecasts. 
We randomly select 140 firms out of 383 firms that were listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange in 1997. We then hand-collect all RP sales of goods and services data 
for the 140 companies, from their annual reports during the period of 1998 to 2004. 
Statistical analysis of the data collected for our sample firms indicate that they are not 
significantly different in their characteristics from the entire population of 383 firms. 
Both our two-way fixed effect panel data analysis and our pooled ordinary least square 
regressions suggest that RP sales significantly reduce earnings informativeness in 
China. The results are robust after controlling for factors that may affect earnings 
informativeness such as firm size, market-to-book ratio, and leverage. In addition, we 
find that Chinese financial analysts do not account for the adverse impact of RP sales 
on earnings. In particular, their forecasts are considerably less accurate for firms with 
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more RP sales of goods and services, and the forecasts they provide become ever more 
excessively optimistic the more firms engage in RP sales. These results suggest that 
financial analysts are unduly willing to trust earnings numbers that are contaminated by 
unreliable RP sales, consistent with the evidence in Teoh and Wong (2002) on the 
credulity of financial analysts. In summary, our results suggest that RP sales 
significantly reduce both earnings informativeness to investors and the quality of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts in China. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we provide the 
institutional background on China’s disclosure of RP transactions. Section III discusses 
prior research and develops our hypotheses. We present the research design, data and 
empirical results of the impact of RP sales on earnings informativeness and on the 
quality of analysts’ forecasts in sections IV and V, respectively. Section VI provides a 
conclusion. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
 
In 1997, the Chinese Ministry of Finance, which serves as the accounting standards 
setter in China, promulgated an accounting standard for RP transactions (hereafter, the 
RPT Standard), which requires publicly listed companies to disclose all material RPTs 
in the form of notes to the financial statements. The RPT Standard defines RPTs to 
include transactions occurring between a listed firm and its parent company or with 
another affiliated firm. However, the related parties need not necessarily be other listed 
companies. They may also be a listed firm and its management, board members, 
principal owners, or members of the immediate families of any of these groups. 
Nevertheless, as Chinese firms are largely owned by corporate shareholders, almost all 
RP transactions are executed between listed firms and their respective affiliated firms 
such as parent companies or other subsidiaries of these parent companies (Aharony et 
al. 2010). 
The RPT Standard has relatively detailed disclosure requirements, similar to 
those set forth by SFAS 57 in the USA (Gordon, Henry and Palia 2004). The disclosure 
must include information on the nature of the relationship between the parties involved, 
the core operations of each related party, a description of the nature of each type of 
transaction, and information on the amounts involved. The RPT Standard also lists the 
various types of RPTs that publicly listed firms must disclose in the form of notes to the 
financial statements: sales and purchases of goods and services, commission 
relationships, overhead reimbursements, transfer of R&D, permits and franchises, trade 
of assets other than goods, including exchange of fixed assets, capital and operating 
leases and borrowing or lending, including interest payments. 
 
III. PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Concerns that RP transactions could adversely impact the reliability of financial 
information both in terms of representational faithfulness and reliability of reported 
amounts date back to 1982, when the FASB issued the Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standards No. 57. As pointed out in SFAS 57, “transactions involving 
related parties cannot be presumed to be carried out on an arm’s-length basis, as the 
requisite conditions of competitive, free-market dealings may not exist.” It further 
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elaborates that “relationships between parties may enable one of the parties to exercise 
a degree of influence over the other such that the influenced party may be favored or 
caused to subordinate it independent interests” (para. 13, FASB 1982). Such concerns 
did not draw much attention until the outburst of the recent accounting scandals of 
Enron, Adelphia and others. Enron used special purpose entities controlled by its CEO 
to manipulate income and Adelphia guaranteed related party debt and provided 
extensive loans to executives. In both cases, the result was irrelevant and unreliable 
accounting information. Nevertheless, there is limited empirical evidence on the impact 
of RP transactions on the quality of key accounting information such as earnings. To 
the best of our knowledge, Gordon and Henry (2003) is the first and only study to use 
US data to show the impact of RP transactions on earnings quality. They show that 
absolute abnormal accruals are positively associated with RP transactions, suggesting 
that this is due to the incentive of managers to manipulate earnings to mask their 
expropriation from RP transactions. As abnormal accruals are well accepted as a 
measure of earnings quality (see, e.g., Dechow and Schrand 2004), Gordon and Henry’s 
results imply that RP transactions may reduce earnings quality. 
The adverse impact of RP transactions on earnings quality is also documented in 
a China setting. Jian and Wong (2010) show that Chinese listed companies with group 
structure are more likely to engage in RP sales with their parent companies to 
manipulate earnings. Aharony et al. (2010) present evidence of earnings management 
through RP sales during the IPO process in China. They also show that abnormal RP 
sales are positively associated with abnormal accruals. Overall, these studies provide 
empirical evidence of earnings management via or induced by RP transactions. 
The adverse impact of RP transactions on earnings quality implies an adverse 
impact on the usefulness of earnings to investors insofar as earnings usefulness is 
highly dependent on earnings quality (Dechow and Schrand 2004). Following Francis, 
Schipper, and Vincent (2005), we use earnings informativeness to measure the 
usefulness of accounting information. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is stated as 
follows (in alternative form): 
 
H1: Earnings informativeness is negatively associated with the level of the firm’s RP 
sales of goods and services. 
  
Prior studies suggest that financial analysts are credulous in the sense that they 
cannot identify earnings quality erosion due to factors such as opportunistic earnings 
management. For example, Teoh and Wong (2002) show that financial analysts 
systematically underestimate the extent of earnings management, and therefore are 
overly ready to believe that high accruals reflect good news. As already noted, Aharony 
et al. (2010) show that Chinese companies engage in RP sales of goods and services to 
manipulate their earnings and that there is a significant positive association between RP 
sales and absolute abnormal accruals. Consequently, we expect to find that Chinese 
financial analysts are also more credulous about firms that engage in higher level of RP 
sales of goods and services, and that the result will be a higher forecast error and more 
optimistic earnings forecasts. Formally stated, our second hypothesis (in alternative 
form) is: 
 
H2: Financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are less accurate and more optimistic for 
firms that engage in a higher level of RP sales of goods and services. 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF RP SALES ON EARNINGS INFORMATIVENESS 
 
A. Research Design 
 
To test whether earnings informativeness is decreasing with the level of RP sales of 
goods and services (H1), we investigate whether differential earnings informativeness 
exists between firms with RP sales and firms without RP sales. Following Easton and 
Harris (1991), Francis et al. (2005) and others, we assess informativeness by the 
magnitude of the earnings response coefficient (ERC), i.e., the slope coefficients 
obtained from regressions of annual returns on both the level of and change in annual 
earnings. We include interactions between earnings (and changes in earnings) and the 
level of RP sales and interpret the respective estimated coefficients as evidence of 
differences in earnings informativeness or lack of such evidence. We also include in 
these regressions four control variables that have been shown in prior research to affect 
earnings informativeness (losses, firm size, market to book ratio and financial 
leverage). Accordingly, we run the following two regression models: 
 
t,j
4
1k
k
t,jt,jkt,jt,j2t,j0t,j CONEARNRPSEARNEARNRET 1  
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where RETj,t = firm j’s 12-month cumulative raw stock return over the period beginning 
in the fifth month following the end of fiscal year t-1 to the fourth month after fiscal 
year t; EARNj,t = firm j’s net income in year t, scaled by the market value of equity as 
of year-end t-1; ΔEARNj,t = change in net income between year t and t-1, scaled by the 
market value of equity as of year-end t-1; RPSj,t = firm j’s sales of goods and services to 
its related parties for year t, scaled by total net sales for year t; 
k
t,jCON = a vector of 
control variables, k = 1, 2, 3, and 4; 
1
t,jCON  = LOSSj,t = 1 if EARNj,t < 0, and 0 
otherwise; 
2
t,jCON  = SIZEj,t  = the natural log of firm j’s total assets as of year-end t; 
3
t,jCON = MBEj,t = the ratio of firm j’s market value of equity to book value of equity 
as of  year-end t; 
4
t,jCON  = DEBTj,t = firm j’s leverage, measured as the ratio of firm 
j’s long-term debt to total book value of assets as of  year-end t. 
We include the four control variables in our regression analyses because prior 
studies have shown that each is associated with the magnitude of the ERC, our measure 
of earnings informativeness. Hayn (1995) documents that the ERC is smaller for loss 
observations than for profit observations; Chaney and Jeter (1992) find the ERC is 
increasing in firm size while Freeman (1987) reports that it is negatively related to firm 
size; Collins and Kothari (1989) show that the market-to-book ratio, a common 
measure of the firm’s growth, is positively associated with earnings informativeness; 
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finally, Dhaliwal et al. (1991) report that the ERC is negatively associated with 
financial leverage. 
To test hypothesis H1 we examine the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for 
the interaction between earnings and the level of RP sales ( 2 ) in model (1a). 
Similarly, for model (1b) we examine the magnitude of ( 2  + 4 ),  the sum of the 
estimated coefficients for the interactions of level of RP sales with earnings and change 
in earnings, respectively. An adverse impact of RP sales on earnings informativeness 
implies 2 < 0 for the first model and ( 2  + 4 ) < 0 for the second model. 
 
B.  Sample Selection and Data 
 
Our sample consists of 140 companies that were randomly selected without 
replacement from the entire population of 383 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange in 1997. As shown below, our sample firms’ characteristics well represent 
those of the entire population. For each firm, we manually collected all data on RP sales 
of goods and services from the annual reports for the seven-year period 1998 to 2004, a 
total of 980 firm-year observations. Other accounting and financial information was 
obtained from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, the 
leading supplier of both financial accounting data and stock prices for all listed 
companies in China. 
Table 1 presents the sample composition classified by nine major industries 
(two-digit SIC code). The industry classification was first obtained from the China 
Securities Regulatory Committee. We then reclassified the industries into nine 
categories based on Campbell (1996). As there are only a small number of firms in the 
petroleum industries (SIC code 13, 29), we combine them with the basic industries. The 
sample excludes the utility industries (SIC code 46, 48, 49) and the financial services 
industries (SIC code 60-69). As Table 1 shows, the total sample is about 37% of the 
entire population. Per industry, we randomly selected from 25% to 35% of the 
respective population except for the services industry (76%) and the transportation 
industry (53%). The last two columns of Table 1 present the median size (in terms of 
total assets) of our sample firms per industry as of December 31, 1998 and the 
corresponding figures for the entire population per industry, respectively. A Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test (not tabulated) indicates that none of the paired medians are 
significantly different from each other at the 5 percent level or lower. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the variables in models (1a) and (1b). We 
winsorize the observations of each continuous independent variable by half a percent in 
each tail. As depicted in the table, on the average, the 140 sample firms earned an 
11.78% annual return during the sample period 1998 to 2004, compared with a 9.35% 
annual return for the 243 non-sample firms in the same period. The mean of earnings 
scaled by market value is about 1.68% while the mean of change in earnings scaled by 
market value is close to 0% (compared with 1.95% and 0%, respectively, for the non-
sample firms). Notably, on the average, RP sales of goods and services account for 
11.56% of total net sales and more than half (51.47%) of the sample firms have RP 
sales with their parent companies. As for the control variables, 8.63 percent of the 
sample firms report losses during the sample period; on the average, size measured by 
total assets’ book value is 2,003 million RMB (total equity market value is 3,110 
264                                                                                                   Wang and Yuan 
 
 
million RMB), market-to-book ratio is 3.90 and financial leverage ratio is 7.75%. In 
comparison, of the remaining 243 non-sample firms listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange during the same period, 9.58 percent report losses, and on the average, their 
size, measured by total assets, is 2,319 million RMB (total equity market value is 3,310 
million RMB), their market-to-book ratio is 4.33, and their financial leverage ratio is 
7.15%. Either a t-test between mean values or a Wilcoxon signed-rank test between 
medians (not tabulated) indicates that there is no significant difference between our 
randomly selected sample and the remaining non-selected firms on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange for any of the summary statistics reported above. 
  
Table 1 
Sample firm composition by industry 
Industry 
Two-digit 
SIC Code 
Number 
of 
Sample 
Firms 
Percentage 
of Total 
Population a 
Median Total 
Assets of 
Sample Firms 
as of 
12.31.1998 
(million 
RMB) 
Median Total 
Assets of Total 
Population as 
of 12.31.1998  
(million RMB) 
      
Food and tobacco 
 
1, 2, 9, 20, 
21, 54 
16 28% (57) 740.58 841.48 
Basic industries 
including 
petroleum 
 
10, 12, 13, 
14, 24, 
26, 28, 
29, 33 
22 34% (64) 682.16 706.00 
Construction 15, 16, 17, 
32, 52 
28 35% (79) 1,076.57 837.22 
Textiles and trade 
 
 
22, 23, 31, 
51, 53, 
56, 59 
5 33% (15) 1,307.51 796.91 
Consumer durables 
 
25, 30, 36, 
37, 39, 
50, 55, 57 
23 29% (78) 1,031.70 1047.58 
Capital goods 34, 35, 38 7 35% (20) 928.10 934.44 
Transportation 
 
40, 41, 42, 
44, 45, 47 
9 53% (17) 910.99 785.52 
Services 
 
 
72, 73 75, 
76, 80, 
82, 87, 89 
25 76% (33) 787.52 949.87 
Conglomerate 
 
 
No 
specific 
SIC code 
5 25% (20) 877.67 938.73 
Entire sample  140 37% (383) 901.33 881.63 
a The number of listed firms in the entire population per industry is in parentheses.  
The table shows the sample composition of 140 firms randomly selected from the entire population of 383 
firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in 1997, classified by nine major industries (two-digit SIC 
code). The industry classification is based on Campbell (1996). As the number of firms in the petroleum 
industries (SIC code 13, 29) is small, we combine them with the basic industries. The sample excludes the 
utility industries (SIC code 46, 48, 49) and the financial services industries (SIC 60-69). 
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for the variables in regression models (1a) and (1b) 
a
 
Variable Mean Median 
Std.  
Dev. 
Mean Values 
for the 243 
Non-sample 
Firms b 
12-month stock return (RET) 0.1178 0.0140 0.5035 0.0935 
     
Earnings as % of market value (EARN) 1.68% 1.93% 3.59% 1.95% 
     
ΔEarnings as % of market value (ΔEARN) 0.00% -0.05% 3.61% 0.00% 
     
RP sales as % of total net sales (RPS) 11.56% 0.03% 20.05% NAc 
     
% RP sales > 0 51.47% -- -- NA 
     
Total RP sales (million RMB) 141.70 0.28 627.30 NA 
     
Total net sales (million RMB) 1,213.93 599.65 1,648.67 1,169.78 
     
% Earnings < 0 (LOSS) 8.63% -- -- 9.58% 
     
Total assets (million RMB) 2,002.77 1,285.52 2,210.20 2,313.83 
     
Market-to-book ratio (MBE) 3.90 3.38 2.39 4.33 
     
Long-term debt as % of total assets 
(DEBT) 7.75% 2.74% 11.18% 7.15% 
     
Equity market value (million RMB) 3,110.28 2,369.61 2,860.71 3310.23 
a Based on data for 140 sample firms in the period from 1998 to 2004 (980 firm-year observations). b The 
entire population of 343 firms less our 140 sample firms. c Not Available. 
Variable definitions: 12-month stock return (RET) is firm j’s stock return for year t, beginning four months 
following the end of year t-1 and ending four months after the end of year t; Earnings as % of market value 
(EARN) is firm j’s net income (before extraordinary items) in year t scaled by its market value of equity as of 
year-end t -1; ΔEarnings as % of market value (ΔEARN) is firm j’s net income in year t minus net income in 
year t -1, scaled by its market value of equity as of year-end t -1; RP sales as % of total net sales (RPS) is firm 
j’s sales of goods and services to its related parties in year t, scaled by its total net sales in year t; % RP sales 
>0 is the percentage of firms with RP sales greater than  zero in year t; Total RP sales is firm j’s total sales of 
goods and services to its related parties in year t; Total net sales is firm j’s total sales revenue net of sales 
allowance, sales discount, and sales returns in year t; % Earnings < 0 (LOSS) is the percentage of firms with 
reported negative net income in year t; Total assets is firm j’s total book value of assets as of year-end t; 
Market-to-book ratio (MBE) is the ratio of firm j’s market value of equity to book value of equity as of  year-
end t; Long-term debt as % total assets (DEBT) is the ratio of firm j’s long-term debt to total book value of 
assets as of  year-end t; Equity market value is firm j’s closing price as of  year-end t times total number of 
outstanding common shares as of year-end t. 
 
 
C.  Empirical Results 
  
We use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to estimate models (1a) and 
(1b). To control for possible heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems, we also 
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employ two-way fixed effects panel data regressions. The disadvantage of the fixed 
effects analysis is its relatively low power, due to the large number of dummy variables 
that may sap the model of the degrees of freedom required for adequately powerful 
statistical tests. Moreover, a model with a large number of such variables may be 
plagued with multicollinearity, which increases the standard errors, thereby draining the 
model of statistical power to test parameters. 
Based on untabulated correlation coefficients among the variables in the earnings 
informativeness analysis, we find that both earnings level and changes are positively 
associated with annual stock returns. Among the independent variables, we observe 
large correlation coefficients, particularly among earnings level, earnings changes, and 
losses. For example, the correlation coefficient between firm losses (LOSS) and 
earnings level (EARN) is -0.684 with p-value of 0.000. To alleviate concerns about 
problems of multicollinearity among the independent variables, we calculate the 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all OLS regression variables. Neter, Wasserman and 
Kunter (1983) suggest that a VIF level below 10 indicates the absence of 
multicollinearity problems. The results of these tests indicate that none of the 
independent variables has a VIF value that exceeds 2. We conclude, therefore, that no 
serious multicollinearity problem is present in the regression analysis. 
The regression results reported in Table 3 strongly support hypothesis H1 that 
earnings informativeness is negatively associated with the firm’s level of RP sales of 
goods and services. This is evident from the estimated coefficients of our main 
variables of interest, EARN×RPS and ΔEARN×RPS. In model (1a), the estimated 
coefficient of EARN×RPS, 2ˆ , is -2.501 (p-value = 0.001) for the pooled regression 
and -1.640 (p-value = 0.008) for the two-way fixed effect regression. In model (1b), the 
estimate of ( 42 ˆˆ  ) is -3.933 (p-value of 0.030) for the pooled regression and -3.396 
(p-value of 0.019) for the two-way fixed effect regression. 
 
 
Table 3 
The impact of related party sales on earnings informativeness – regression results of 
models (1a) and (1b) 
a 
 
Variable (coefficient) 
Pooled Regressions 
Two-Way Fixed Effects 
Regressions 
 Model (1a) Model (1b) Model (1a) Model (1b) 
     
Intercept (
0ˆ ) 
   -0.122*** 
(0.000) 
-0.114 
 (0.000) 
   -0.354*** 
(0.003) 
    -0.345*** 
 (0.003) 
EARN (
1ˆ ) 
    5.747*** 
(0.001) 
    7.975*** 
 (0.000) 
    3.637*** 
(0.004) 
     4.749*** 
 (0.002) 
EARN×RPS (
2ˆ ) 
   -2.501*** 
(0.001) 
    -2.772*** 
 (0.002) 
   -1.640*** 
(0.008) 
    -2.072*** 
 (0.007) 
ΔEARN (
3ˆ )  
    3.781** 
 (0.048) 
 
 2.400 
 (0.090) 
ΔEARN×RPS (
4ˆ ) 
 
 
-1.161 
 (0.312) 
 
 
-1.324 
 (0.122) 
EARN×LOSS ( 1ˆ ) 
   -8.798*** 
(0.000) 
    -8.392*** 
 (0.000) 
 -11.535*** 
      (0.000) 
   -9.004*** 
 (0.000) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
EARN×SIZE ( 2ˆ ) 
0.177 
(0.053) 
 0.109 
 (0.303) 
    0.500*** 
 (0.000) 
     0.466*** 
 (0.000) 
EARN×MBE ( 3ˆ ) 
    1.063*** 
(0.000) 
     0.875*** 
 (0.003) 
    -0.457*** 
 (0.038) 
    -0.911*** 
 (0.001) 
EARN×DEBT ( 4ˆ ) 
-13.234** 
(0.012) 
  -17.337*** 
 (0.005) 
-4.997 
 (0.313) 
-3.369 
 (0.574) 
ΔEARN×LOSS ( 1ˆ ) 
 
 
 0.084 
 (0.970) 
 
    3.587** 
 (0.032) 
ΔEARN×SIZE ( 2ˆ ) 
 
 
-0.065 
 (0.526) 
 
-0.074 
  (0.330) 
ΔEARN×MBE ( 3ˆ ) 
 
 
-0.358 
 (0.303) 
 
   -0.623** 
 (0.018) 
ΔEARN×DEBT ( 4ˆ ) 
 
 
    -12.122 
  (0.219) 
 
 0.217 
 (0.976) 
Two-way fixed effects 
(firm and time dummies) 
Not 
included 
Not included Included Included 
No. of observations 980 980 980 980 
Adj. R-square 0.221 0.221 0.697 0.706 
EARN*RPS + 
ΔEARN*RPS 
(
2ˆ + 4ˆ ) 
 
-3.933** 
(0.030) 
 
-3.396** 
(0.019) 
a Based on data for 980 firm-year observations (140 sample firms for the seven-year period from 1998 to 
2004). The table reports the results for regression models (1a) and (1b): 
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4
1k
k
t,jt,jkt,jt,j2t,j0t,j 1
 

,   
t,jt,j4t,jt,jt,j2t,j0t,j RPS*EARNEARNRPS*EARNEARNRET 31 
 
)b1(CON*EARNCON*EARN t,j
k
t,j
4
1k
t,jk
4
1k
k
t,jt,jk   

 
Variable definitions: RET is firm j’s 12-month stock return for year t,  beginning four months following the 
end of year t-1 and ending four months after the end of year t; EARN is firm j’s net income (before 
extraordinary items) in year t scaled by its market value of equity as of year-end t -1; ΔEARN is firm j’s net 
income in year t minus net income in year t -1, scaled by its market value of equity as of year-end t -1; RPS is 
firm j’s sales of goods and services to its related parties in year t, scaled by its total net sales in year t; LOSS 
takes value of one if EARN is positive and zero otherwise; SIZE is the natural log of firm j’s total assets in 
year t;  MBE is the ratio of firm j’s market value of equity to book value of equity as of  year-end t; DEBT is 
the ratio of firm j’s long-term debt to total book value of assets as of  year-end t; p-values are reported in 
parentheses. ** and *** denote two-tailed significance at the  5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Easton and Harris 1991 and Francis et al. 
2005 in the US, and Chen, Chen, and Su, 2001 in China) all regression results in Table 
3 show that the earnings response coefficients (ERC), relating stock returns to the level 
and change in earnings, are positive and significant. For example, for the pooled 
regression, 1ˆ , the estimated coefficient of EARN, is 5.747 (p-value of 0.001) in model 
(1a) and 
3ˆ , the estimated coefficient of ΔEARN is 3.781 (p-value of 0.048) in model 
(1b). The effects of RP sales on the magnitude of deterioration in earnings 
informativeness may be assessed by the ratio of 2ˆ  to 1ˆ  in model (1a), or the ratio of 
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( 42 ˆˆ  ) to ( 31 ˆˆ  ) in model (1b). The coefficient estimates obtained from the two-
way fixed effect regressions indicate that earnings of firms with RP sales are about 45% 
- 48% less informative ((-1.640/3.637) =-45% in model (1a) and -3.396/(4.749 + 2.400) 
= -48% in model (1b)). Based on pooled regressions, earnings of firms with RP sales 
are about 33% - 44% less informative (-2.501/5.747= -44% in model (1a) and -
3.933/(7.975 + 3.781) = -33% in model (1b)). 
The estimated coefficients for the control variables in both regressions are 
generally consistent with those reported in prior literature. The loss (LOSS) 
observations reduce the ERC, as evidenced by the negative and highly significant 
coefficient estimates 1ˆ  in model (1a) and ( 1ˆ  + 1ˆ ) in model (1b). These results are 
consistent with those of Hayn (1995). Firm size (SIZE) increases earnings 
informativeness, as evidenced by the positive and highly significant coefficient 
estimates 2ˆ  in model (1a) and ( 2ˆ  + 2ˆ ) in model (1b) obtained by the two-way 
fixed effects regressions (though they are positive but statistically insignificant in the 
pooled regressions). These results are consistent with those of Chaney and Jeter (1992). 
Consistent with Collins and Kothari (1989), the results for the pooled regression show 
that the market-to-book ratio of equity (MBE) is positively associated with earnings 
informativeness. This is evidenced by the positive and highly significant coefficient 
estimates 3ˆ  in model (1a) and ( 3ˆ  + 3ˆ ) in model (1b). However, for the two-way 
fixed effects regressions the corresponding coefficient estimates are negative and highly 
significant. We have no explanation for this. Lastly, consistent with Dhaliwal et al. 
(1991), we find a negative effect of financial leverage (DEBT) on earnings 
informativeness. This is demonstrated by the negative coefficient estimates 4ˆ  in 
model (1a) and ( 4ˆ  + 4ˆ ) in model (1b) in both the pooled and two-way fixed effects 
regressions. However, while in the former the corresponding coefficient estimates are 
highly statistically significant, in the latter they are not. 
 
V. THE IMPACT OF RP SALES ON THE QUALITY OF ANALYSTS’ 
EARNINGS FORECASTS 
 
A. Research Design 
  
To test whether financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are less accurate and more 
optimistic for firms that engage in a higher level of RP sales of goods and services (H2), 
we first estimate two important properties of earnings forecasts: forecast accuracy and 
forecast bias. Following the tradition in the literature (e.g., Duru and Reeb 2002), we 
measure financial analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, for each firm-year observation, 
by the absolute value of the difference between the consensus analysts’ earnings per 
share forecast and the actual earnings per share, scaled by the stock price at the latest 
forecast date: 
 
                             
1t
t
1t
t
t
PRICE
|EPSFORECAST|
)1(ACCU

 
 ,                            (2) 
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where ACCUt = the negative of the consensus absolute forecast error for year t; 
1t
tFORECAST
  = the consensus analysts’ earnings per share forecast for year t made 
prior to actual earnings announcement for year t; EPSt = the actual earnings per share 
for year t; PRICEt-1 = the stock price per share at the latest forecast date. 
Multiplying this absolute forecast error by (-1) gives a measure that increases 
with greater forecast accuracy. Thus, when a firm attribute is positively associated with 
ACCU, such an attribute contributes to a more accurate analyst forecast. 
We measure financial analysts’ earnings forecast bias (BIAS), for each firm-year 
observation, as the signed forecast error, defined as the difference between the 
consensus analysts’ earnings per share forecast and the actual earnings per share, scaled 
by the stock price at the latest forecast date: 
 
1t
t
1t
t
t
PRICE
EPSFORECAST
)OPTIMISM(BIAS

 
 .                         (3) 
 
Forecast optimism increases as BIAS becomes larger. Thus, when a firm 
attribute is positively associated with BIAS, such an attribute contributes to a more 
optimistic analyst forecast. 
We next examine the association between RP sales of goods and services and 
each of the two forecast properties, ACCU and BIAS, by regressing each measure 
separately on the level of RP sales of goods and services and on six control variables 
that have been shown in prior studies to influence the two properties of analysts’ 
forecasting: accuracy and bias. Accordingly, we run the following regression model: 
 
t,j5t,j4t,j3t,j2t,j0t,jt,j HORZEARNLOSSSIZERPS)BIAS(ACCU 1   
       t,jt,j7t,j6 mmiesIndustryDusTimeDummieDISPFOL  ,         (4) 
 
where ACCUj,t = firm j’s earnings forecast accuracy in year t as defined by Eq (2); 
BIASj,t = firm j’s earnings forecast bias in year t as defined by Eq (3); RPSj,t = firm j’s 
sales of goods and services to its related parties for year t, scaled by total net sales in 
year t; SIZEj,t = the natural log of firm j’s total assets as of year-end t; LOSSj,t = a 
dummy variable, equal to one when firm j’s net income for year t is negative, and zero 
otherwise; ΔEARNj,t = change in net income between year t and t-1, scaled by the 
market value of equity as of year-end t-1; HORZj,t = firm j’s forecast horizon in year t, 
expressed as the number of months between the forecast’s month and the end of fiscal 
year t; FOLj,t = number of financial analysts following firm j in year t; DISPj,t = 
financial analysts’ forecast dispersion, measured as the standard deviation of firm j’s 
analysts’ forecasts in year t deflated by the stock price per share at the forecast date; 
TimeDummies = six dummies for the seven-year period 1998-2004; and 
IndustryDummies = eight dummies for the nine industries outlined in Table 1. 
Duru and Reeb (2002) find that firm size (SIZE) likely indicates more 
complexity and thus greater forecast error, but, at the same time, the availability of 
more pre-disclosure information by larger firms may lead to lower forecast error. 
Hwang et al. (1996) document that analysts’ forecasts of losses (LOSS) are less 
accurate than their forecasts of profits, and Brown (2001) provides evidence that 
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analysts issue more optimistic forecasts in loss periods. Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
find that larger changes in earnings (ΔEARN) are associated with less accurate 
forecasts. Prior studies (e.g., Brown 1993) indicate that longer forecast horizons 
(HORZ) are associated with less accurate analysts’ earning forecasts. Lys and Soo 
(1995) find that forecast accuracy increases with the number of financial analysts 
following the firm (FOL), whereas Das et al. (1998) suggest less optimistic forecasts 
for more heavily followed firms. Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that forecast 
dispersion (DISP) is negatively related to analysts’ forecast accuracy. Finally, to control 
for the potential impact of changes in macro economic conditions and industry 
complexity, throughout the sample period, on analysts' forecasting behavior, we add 
time-dummies and industry-dummies to regression model (4). 
 
B.  Earnings Per Share Forecast Data 
  
Chinese earnings forecast data were obtained from Investoday Ltd., a leading financial 
information vendor based in Shenzhen, China. The data consist of annual earnings per 
share forecasts for listed companies covered by Chinese sell-side analysts since 2002. 
We obtained annual earnings per share forecast data for the three-year period 2002-
2004 and merged it with the data described in section IV for our 140 sample firms. This 
procedure resulted in a reduced sample consisting of a total of 361 firm-year 
observations representing the 140 firms during the period 2002-2004. Due to the fact 
that some sample companies were not covered by financial analysts in the early years, 
the final number of firm-year observations is 361 rather than 420, i.e., 140 times 3. 
Based on untabulated correlation coefficients among the variables participating 
in the analysts’ forecasts analysis, we find that RP sales of goods and services as a 
percentage of total net sales are associated with less accurate and more optimistic 
forecasts, consistent with hypothesis H2. We also find that analysts issue less accurate 
and more optimistic forecasts in loss firm-years, as does Brown (2001). Similarly to the 
approach taken in section IV, we calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for all 
OLS regression variables to alleviate concerns about multicollinearity problems among 
the independent variables. The results of these tests indicate that none of the 
independent variables has a VIF value that exceeds 3. We conclude, therefore, that no 
serious multicollinearity problem is present in the regression analysis. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for the variables in regression model (4). We 
winsorize the observations of each continuous independent variable by half a percent in 
each tail. The mean and median accuracy (ACCU) values are negative by construction. 
The closer the accuracy value is to zero, the more accurate is the forecast. Thus, 
variables that are positively related to ACCU are associated with more accurate 
forecasts. Consistent with US analysts’ behavior (e.g., Richardson et al. 2004), the 
mean and median signed forecast errors (BIAS) are positive, indicating that Chinese 
analysts are, on the average, optimistic. Variables that are positively related to BIAS are 
associated with more optimistic forecasts. As mean and median consensus forecast data 
give similar results, we report only the results based on the mean forecasts. Notably, 
compared with the full sample used in section IV, the reduced sample firms have a 
lower average ratio of RP sales of goods and services over total net sales (7.49% versus 
11.56%) but a higher median ratio (0.46% versus 0.03%). In addition, 13.3% of the 
reduced sample firms report losses, compared with 8.63% of the full sample. Firm size 
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measured by total assets indicates that the reduced sample is, on the average, larger, 
probably because its statistics is based on more recent years. As for the remaining 
analyst forecasts’ control variables, on the average, analysts make their last forecasts 
about one month (0.967) prior to the actual earnings announcement date; there are five 
analysts following each sample firm; and forecast dispersion is about 0.5% of stock 
prices at the forecast date. 
 
Table 4 
Summary statistics for the variables in regression model (4)
a
 
Variables Mean Median 
Std.  
Dev. 
    
Mean consensus forecast (FORECAST) 0.144 0.125 0.220 
Median consensus forecast (FORECAST) 0.144 0.124 0.220 
    
Forecast accuracy (ACCU) -0.014 -0.005 0.029 
Forecast bias (BIAS) 0.010 0.002 0.030 
    
RP sales as % of total net sales (RPS) 7.49% 0.46% 17.61% 
    
% of Earnings < 0 (LOSS) 13.3% -- -- 
Total assets (million RMB) 2,809.66 1,875.68 3,004.23 
Earnings changes as % of market value (ΔEARN ) 0.01% 0.05% 5.05% 
Forecast horizon (HORZ) 0.967 0.500 2.938 
Number of analysts following (FOL) 5.125 3.000 6.160 
Forecast dispersion (DISP) 0.005 0.002 0.009 
a Based on data for 140 sample firms in the period from 2002 to 2004 (361 firm-year observations). 
Variable definitions: mean (median) consensus forecast (FORECAST) is analysts’ forecast of annual earnings 
of Chinese firms; forecast accuracy (ACCU) is firm j’s earnings forecast accuracy in year t as defined by Eq 
(2); forecast bias (BIAS) is firm j’s earnings forecast bias in year t as defined by Eq (3); related party sales 
(RPS) is firm j’s sales of goods and services to its related parties, scaled by total net sales in fiscal year t; firm 
size (SIZE) is the natural log of firm j’s total assets as of year-end t; loss firm-years (LOSS) is a dummy 
variable, equal to one when firm j’s net earnings for  year t are negative, and zero otherwise; earnings changes 
(ΔEARN ) is change in EARNj,t between year t-1 and t, scaled by market value of equity as of year-end  t-1; 
forecast horizon (HORZ) is firm j’s forecast horizon in year t, expressed as the number of months between 
the forecast month and the end of year t; number of analysts following (FOL) is the number of financial 
analysts following firm j in year t; forecast dispersion (DISP) is the analysts’ forecast dispersion, measured as 
the standard deviation of firm j’s analysts’ forecasts in year t deflated by the stock price per share at  the  
forecast date 
 
 
C. Empirical Results 
  
We use pooled ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to estimate model (4). The 
regression results reported in Table 5 strongly support hypothesis H2 that financial 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are less accurate and more optimistic for firms with a 
higher level of RP sales of goods and services. These results are obtained after 
controlling for previously identified determinants of forecast accuracy and bias. 
Regression results using forecast accuracy as a dependent variable are presented in the 
second column and those with forecast bias as a dependent variable in the third column. 
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Our primary result is that the level of RP sales of goods and services (RPS), in 
the forecast accuracy model, is negatively and significantly associated with forecast 
accuracy ( 1ˆ  is -0.003, significant at the 5% level), indicating that analysts provide less 
accurate forecasts for firms that have a higher level of sales of goods and services with 
their related parties. This may suggest that Chinese financial analysts do not adequately 
account for the adverse impact of RP sales on earnings. Consistent with prior research, 
the results also show highly significant negative coefficient estimates (p-value = 0.001 
or lower) for firm losses (LOSS), changes in earnings (ΔEARN), forecast horizon 
(HORZ) and forecast dispersion (DISP), suggesting that each of these four control 
variables is associated with less accurate analyst forecasts. Only the coefficient 
estimates for firm size (SIZE) and analyst following (FOL) are insignificantly different 
from zero. 
 
Table 5 
The impact of related party sales on analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy – regression 
results of model (4) 
a
 
Variable (coefficient) Forecast Accuracy 
(ACCU) 
Forecast Bias 
(BIAS) 
Intercept (
0ˆ ) 
-0.030 
(0.658) 
 0.020 
 (0.342) 
RPS (
1ˆ ) 
 -0.003** 
(0.025) 
    0.004** 
 (0.043) 
SIZE (
2ˆ ) 
0.001 
(0.536) 
               -0.001 
 (0.365) 
LOSS (
3ˆ ) 
   -0.028*** 
(0.000) 
     0.030*** 
 (0.000) 
ΔEARN (
4ˆ ) 
   -0.302*** 
(0.000) 
     0.337*** 
 (0.000) 
HORZ (
5ˆ ) 
   -0.001*** 
(0.001) 
     0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
FOL (
6ˆ ) 
0.000 
(0.756) 
 0.000 
 (0.936) 
DISP (
7ˆ ) 
   -0.744*** 
(0.000) 
     0.623*** 
 (0.000) 
Time dummies Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included 
# of observations & Adj. R2 361; 0.628 361; 0.657 
a Based on data for 361 firm-year observations (140 sample firms with earnings forecasts available from 
2002 to 2004. The table reports the results for regression equation (4): 
t,j5t,j4t,j3t,j2t,j0t,jt,j HORZEARNLOSSSIZERPS)BIAS(ACCU 1 
                           
t,jt,j7t,j6 mmiesIndustryDusTimeDummieDISPFOL 
, 
Variable definitions: forecast accuracy (ACCU) is firm j’s earnings forecast accuracy in year t as defined by 
Eq (2); forecast bias (BIAS) is firm j’s earnings forecast bias in year t as defined by Eq (3); RPS is firm j’s 
sales of goods and services to its related parties, scaled by total net sales in fiscal year t; SIZE is the natural 
log of firm j’s total assets as of year-end t; LOSS is a dummy variable, equal to one when firm j’s earnings 
(EARNj,t ) for  year t are negative,  and zero otherwise; ΔEARN  is the change in EARNj,t between year t-1 
and t, scaled by the market value of equity as of year-end  t-1; HORZ is firm j’s forecast horizon in year t, 
expressed as the number of months between the forecast month and the end of year t; FOL is number of 
financial analysts following firm j in year t; DISP is the analysts’ forecast dispersion, measured as the 
standard deviation of firm j’s analysts’ forecasts in year t deflated by the stock price per share at the forecast 
date. p values are reported in parentheses. ** and *** denote significance at a level of 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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The last column of Table 5 reports the results of model (4) using earnings 
forecast bias (BIAS) as a dependent variable. We find that the level of RP sales (RPS) 
is positively associated with earnings forecast bias ( 1ˆ = 0.004, significant at the 5%  
level), This result is consistent with our prediction that financial analysts provide more 
optimistic earnings forecasts for firms that engage in a higher level of RP sales of goods 
and services with their related parties. Our interpretation of this finding is that Chinese 
financial analysts are credulous about RP sales and thus provide more optimistic 
earnings forecasts. Consistent with prior research, the results also show highly 
significant positive coefficient estimates (p-value = 0.001) for firm losses (LOSS), 
changes in earnings (ΔEARN), forecast horizon (HORZ) and forecast dispersion 
(DISP), suggesting that each of these four control variables is associated with more 
optimistic earnings forecasts. Only the coefficient estimates for firm size (SIZE) and 
analyst following (FOL) are insignificantly different from zero. These results are also 
consistent with our earnings prediction accuracy model. 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that RP transactions impair the representational 
faithfulness and verifiability of accounting data. Thus, for example, the misreporting of 
profitability via RP transactions by a former CFO of Enron only became apparent as the 
firm began to collapse. In this paper we explore whether RP sales of goods and services 
reduce earnings informativeness to capital market investors and consequently affect the 
quality of earnings forecasts by financial analysts. We focus on RP sales of goods and 
services because they affect accounting earnings more directly than other types of RP 
transactions such as directors’ loans. 
Using a random sample of 140 firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange, we find 
a significant negative association between the level of RP sales of goods and services 
and earnings informativeness measured by the earnings response coefficient (ERC), 
after controlling for other factors known to affect the ERC. Earnings of firms engaged 
in RP sales are at least 33% less informative than those of other firms. The results are 
consistent with the contention that RP sales violate the arm’s-length assumption for 
regular transactions and hence reduce the quality of accounting earnings. We also find 
that financial analysts credulously accept misleading RP sales data and provide less 
accurate and more optimistic earnings forecasts for firms with more RP sales of goods 
and services. Overall, our results show that RP sales of goods and services reduce the 
usefulness of accounting earnings to capital market investors and make it more difficult 
for financial analysts to provide accurate earnings forecasts. 
The paper has, at least, two implications. The results have policy implications for 
China and other markets with pervasive related party transactions. As outlined in 
Aharony et al. (2010), the Chinese government has been taking actions to minimize the 
negative impact of related party sales between listed companies and their parent 
companies. For example, since 2006, the Chinese government has been encouraging 
unlisted parent companies to take the entire entity public, in order to create a standard-
alone listed company rather than a parent-subsidiary group which involves pervasive 
related party sales. Our results also suggest that financial analysts should not be unduly 
willing to trust earnings numbers that are contaminated by unreliable related party 
sales. However, the limitation is that financial analysts cannot observe the quality of 
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related party sales directly from companies’ financial disclosures. Thus they should 
acquire more private information about related party sales.  
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